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The collapse of the Soviet Union has resulted in far-reaching
changes in the global environment. One of the immediate effects of the
demise of what Ronald Reagan dubbed the Evil Empire was the need to
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find useful work for the army of FBI agents who formerly were assigned to
counter-intelligence. Because they would no longer be sitting for hours in
unmarked vehicles in full surveillance mode, those agents were available
for reassignment. According to intelligence agencies, FBI agents were not
the only ones looking for work. The reduction in East-West tensions
enabled intelligence services in allied nations to devote greater resources to
collecting sensitive United States economic information and technology.
While its full implications are not yet apparent, the passage of the
Economic Espionage Act of 1996 might be viewed as the FBI agent full
employment act. The government will now make use of sophisticated
investigators hitherto employed at rooting out spies, waste, fraud, abuse,
and other criminal activities in an effort to protect something else that is
vital to our national security and prosperity - the nation's trade secrets. It
is yet one more step in the progress of the effort to criminalize conduct that
was formerly of interest only to commercial lawyers.
I. BACKGROUND
The Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 1831 et seq.,
became effective on October 11, 1996. Its passage was prompted by
concern over the efforts of foreign businesses and governments to conduct
industrial espionage against United States businesses both at home and
abroad. United States intelligence reports established that there was a
continuing threat of economic espionage that was emanating mostly from
such allies as France, Japan, and Israel. Oddly enough, the businesses
most routinely at risk were those in the defense industry. Apparently the
R&D costs involved in home-grown defense technology were too high for
our foreign friends. Rather, they wanted cutting-edge weapon systems
technology at a cut-rate price.
The Act also provided American businesses with the prospect of
federal assistance in the effort to prevent competitors from stealing their
intellectual property. While twenty six states had legislation on the books
to prevent trade secret theft, the federal law provides protection for
businesses in the states without appropriate legislation and provides another
option for aggrieved businesses in the states where trade secret acts were
already in place. The federal law does not preempt or displace other
remedies. I
1. 18 U.S.C. § 1838 (1996).
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II. THE DIMENSIONS OF THE PROBLEM
A 1994 Report to Congress on Foreign Acquisition of and
Espionage Activities Against United States Critical Technology Companies
reported that the intelligence organization of one ally ran an espionage
operation that paid a United States government employee to obtain United
States classified military intelligence documents. Citizens of that ally were
found to be stealing sensitive United States technology used in
manufacturing artillery gun tubes within the United States. Other agents of
that ally stole design plans for a classified reconnaissance system from a
United States company and gave them to a defense contractor in their home
country. A company based in the territory of the ally was suspected of
surreptitiously monitoring a Defense Department telecommunications
system in order to obtain classified information for the intelligence
organization of its government. Citizens of that country were investigated
for passing advanced aerospace design technology to unauthorized
scientists and researchers.
According to the 1994 report, another country that did not
maintain its own intelligence service relied on private companies to do that
kind of work. Those firms operate abroad and collect data for their own
purposes, but also gather classified documents and corporate proprietary
information for the use of their government. For example, electronics
firms from that nation directed their data gathering efforts at United States
firms in order to increase the market share of companies in that country in
the semiconductor industry. With friends like that, who needs enemies?
The magnitude of the problem is substantial. The White House
Office of Science and Technology estimated that business espionage cost
United States companies $100 billion annually in lost sales.' The most
likely targets are companies involved in one or more of the technologies
named on its National Critical Technologies List (NCTL). These include
sophisticated manufacturing technology, materials, information, and
telecommunications. Also included are biotechnology, aeronautics, surface
transportation, energy, and environmental technologies. Loss of
proprietary information related to these products would be likely to
undermine the United States strategic industrial position according to the
FBI.
According to the National Counterintelligence Center and the State
Department, seventy-four corporations reported more than 400 incidents of
suspected foreign intelligence incursions against their business last year.
2. Ed Jopeck and Ken Sawka, Foreign Espionage: Is your Business at Risk? (visited Oct.
30, 1997) <http://www.execpc.com/-mhallign/indict.html>.
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Slightly more than half of these incidents involved technologies on the
NCTL. So, much of American commercial activity is potentially at risk.
III. DOESN'T EVERYBODY Do IT?
The CIA has repeatedly denied that the Agency will engage in
corporate spy work.' However, apparently if the information turns up, the
Agency will pass it along to interested parties. The CIA is reportedly
providing the government with information about Japanese auto technology
that may be of support to President Clinton's effort, in cooperation with
Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler, to produce a more fuel-efficient car
through the Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles. While much of
the data on the current state of auto technology abroad may be gathered
from publicly available sources, some of it is gathered clandestinely and is
classified. Battery technology in Japan is of particular interest according to
Matt Dzieciunch, a project engineer at the government-Big Three
cooperative effort known as the United States Advanced Batteries
Consortium.'
For the most part, American companies do not need the
government's help to spy on their competitors. The vast majority of
business and competitive information may be obtained legally and ethically
from newspaper articles, trade publications, SEC filings, specialized
databases, and from materials readily available at trade shows. Sensitive
or restricted data include financial information, manufacturing processes,
customer lists, and other information not normally shared with those
outside a business.
The CIA has long monitored data on such world economic issues
as oil production, crops, world trade, foreign government economic
policies, and technology. After the Clinton Administration formed the
National Economic Council in January 1993, the CIA's role in economic
intelligence grew in support of enhancing United States competitiveness in
the world. By forming a cooperative among the Big Three auto makers,
the government facilitated the sharing of information gathered through
foreign industrial spying. When Stansfield Turner was Director of Central
Intelligence, the agency would brief United States corporations about its
findings of the acquisition plans of foreign governments through seminars
at the Commerce Department. Information sharing has been practiced with
private defense contractors under a number of administrations. Laws
designed to permit American companies to gain access to the work product
3. Robert Dreyfuss, Company Spies, Mother Jones Mo Jo Wire (visited Oct. 30, 1997)
< http://www.mojones.com/motherjones/MJ94/dreyfuss.html >.
4. Id.
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of United States government laboratories and to avail themselves of
cooperative ventures without fear of the antitrust regulators also facilitated
United States government assistance to the military-industrial complex.'
IV. THE ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE ACT OF 1996
The Act treats those who steal on behalf of a foreign government
or knowing that the offense will benefit a foreign government, foreign
instrumentality, or foreign agent differently from those who merely
appropriate trade secrets or business information for domestic use. It also
punishes organizations who engage in the prohibited skullduggery more
harshly than individuals.
A. Penalties for Criminal Violations
Those who steal trade secrets with the intent or knowledge that
they are doing so for or will benefit the foreign entities or agents may be
imprisoned up to fifteen years and fined not more than $500,000. If an
organization gets into the foreign intrigue business and steals trade secrets,
it makes itself liable for a fine not to exceed ten million dollars.
Those who merely want to rob Apple to benefit Bill Gates will be
imprisoned not more than ten years or fined not more than the schedule in
18 U.S.C. § 3571 (1987) permits or both. An organization that limits the
influence of its thefts to United States territory may be fined not more than
$500,000.
Perhaps of more far-reaching significance, the Economic
Espionage Act includes a provision that permits the forfeiture to the United
States of:
any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds
the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as the result of
the violation; and any of the person's property used, or
intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit or
facilitate the commission of the offense ....6
The forfeiture provisions make such forfeiture an option within the
discretion of the court, as part of the sentencing process, "taking into
consideration the nature, scope, and proportionality of the use of the
property in the offense."I Thus, it is within the power of the court to order
what in effect would be a corporate death sentence for a new company
5. Id.
6. 18 U.S.C. § 1834 (a)(1), (a)(2) (1996).
7. 18 U.S.C. § 1834 (a)(2) (1996).
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established on the basis of purloined information in the possession of its
founders.
B. Civil Remedies
Of course, in the business context, the conniving trade secret thief
must be concerned about civil suits, which can result in injunctive relief to
stop the production line, damages, seizure of unjust profits as well as
attorneys fees. This has been the traditional means of stopping the
unlawful conversion of trade secrets. Prior to the enactment of the
Economic Espionage Act of 1996, twenty six states had anti-trade secret
theft laws on the books. Common law theft and conversion statutes also
applied.
The Economic Espionage Act of 1996 permits the Department of
Justice to get involved on the civil side as well,' and it provides that the
Attorney General may obtain appropriate injunctive relief against any
violation of the Act in federal district court.
C. Extraterritorial Application of the EEA
This power potentially may have far-reaching effects, as the law
provides that it is applicable to conduct outside the United States if the
offender is a United States citizen or permanent resident alien or an
organization organized under the laws of the United States government or a
state government or an act in furtherance of the offense was committed in
the United States.9 Thus, if a multinational corporation incorporated in
Delaware engages in trade secret theft in England or hires someone to do
the evil deed abroad on its behalf after a meeting in the company's offices
in New York to plan the theft, the offense may be punished in the United
States.
Likewise, if an American investigator is hired by a foreign
company to commit economic espionage abroad, he may be prosecuted in
the United States (as well as in the country where the crime was
committed, assuming that country prohibits trade secret theft).
D. Economic Espionage and Trade Secret Theft Defined
A trade secret is defined as:
all forms and types of financial, business, scientific,
technical, economic, or engineering information, including
8. 18 U.S.C. § 1836 (1996).
9. 18 U.S.C. § 1837 (1996).
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patterns, plans, compilations, program devices, formulas,
designs, prototypes, methods, techniques, processes,
procedures, programs or codes, whether tangible or
intangible, and whether or how stored, compiled, or
memorialized physically, electronically, graphically,
photographically, or in writing if-
the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to keep
such information secret; and
the information derives independent economic value, actual
or potential, from not being generally known to, and not
being readily ascertainable through proper means by, the
public.10
Thus, in order for the theft to be actionable under this law, the
owner must have taken some measures that objectively would be
reasonable under the circumstances to protect the confidentiality of the
trade secret information at issue, and the government must demonstrate
that the secret has some economic value as a result of its confidentiality.
Thus, it behooves corporate America to add to the compliance programs
established to mitigate any punishment imposed under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines for Organization a program of trade secret
protection. Attorneys who practice in this field will have to figure out
what is reasonable in terms of protection and will have to keep up with
what the courts are saying on the subject. On the defensive side, the
company caught in this sort of conduct may wish to minimize the
protective efforts of its competitive adversary in order to demonstrate that
what appeared to be a trade secret was really readily available and thus,
not a trade secret.
The intent required in order to be guilty of criminal conduct under
the act is different, depending upon whether the theft has foreign
ramifications or not. For economic espionage to be actionable under 18
U.S.C. §1831(a) (the foreign economic espionage offense), the offending
individual or entity must have taken the trade secret knowingly "intending
or knowing that the offense will benefit any foreign government, foreign
instrumentality, or foreign agent."" For the domestic theft of trade secrets
offense, 18 U.S.C. §1832(a), the offender must knowingly have
10. 18 U.S.C. § 1839 (3)(A), (3)(B) (1996).
11. 18 U.S.C. §1831(a) (1996).
1998] 379
380 ILSA Journal of Int'l & Comparative Law
intent to convert a trade secret, that is related to or
included in a produce that is produced for or placed in
interstate or foreign commerce, to the economic benefit or
anyone other than the owner thereof, and intending or
knowing that the offense will injure any owner of that
trade secret. '2
Thus, for a conviction of the domestic trade secret crime, the
government must show not only the theft but also, in effect, that the theft
would damage the owner and would economically benefit someone other
than the owner. The government must also show that the theft occurred
with respect to a product that is in interstate commerce.
In this regard, the Fifth and Seventh Circuits have articulated a
doctrine of inevitable disclosure of trade secrets in subsequent
employment, which simplifies proof of what is a theft. Under this theory,
a change of employment will result in a theft of a trade secret when the
two employers involved are competitors; the new position taken by the
departing employee is comparable to or would inevitably involve
knowledge gained in the previous position; the new employer did not do
enough to protect against disclosure of trade secrets, and there was some
evidence of intent to disclose trade secrets." The First and Eighth Circuit
have considered and rejected the doctrine."1
The law also will punish those who receive, buy, or possess the
stolen trade secret information, knowing that it has been stolen or obtained
without authorization." Attempts and conspiracies to commit trade secret
theft are also offenses under the Act.'6
It is unclear what the status of reverse engineering will be under
this new statute. Silicon Valley entrepreneurs have made fortunes by
moving from company to company and using their knowledge acquired on
their previous job for the benefit of their new employers. A disgruntled
former employer, when anticipating a suit, for example, for sex
discrimination, might launch a pre-emptive strike by suing for theft of
trade secrets under the Economic Espionage Act. Likewise, when a group
of disgruntled auto mechanics leaves dealership A for more remunerative
12. 18 U.S.C. §1832(a) (1996).
13. See Union Carbide Corp. v. UGI Corp., 731 F.2d 1186, 1192 (5th Cir. 1984);
PepsiCo Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1268 (7th Cir. 1995).
14. See Campbell Soup Co. v. Giles, 47 F.3d 467 (1st Cir. 1995) and IBM Corp. v.
Seagate Technology, Inc., 1991 U.S. Dist. Lexis 20406 (D. Minn. 1991), remanded for a more
specific statement of relief, 962 F.2d 12 (8th Cir. 1992).
15. 18 U.S.C. § 1832 (a)(3) (1996).
16. 18 U.S.C. § 1832 (a)(4), (5) (1996).
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work at dealership B and makes off with the list of loyal service customers,
dealership B may end up vicariously liable if the new employees send out
marketing letters to their old customers.
It is notable that this statute is broader in scope than most previous
trade secret laws. By covering business information, the act covers data
that may not be economically useful except by a competitor seeking
financial information or expansion plans or other corporate intelligence. It
also covers attempts to steal trade secrets and conspiracies to steal trade
secrets. 1
Perhaps because of the ambiguities of the statute and the situations
to which it might be applied, Attorney General Janet Reno personally
assured Senator Orrin Hatch prior to passage of the law that for five years
following its effective date, any prosecution undertaken pursuant to the Act
would have to be personally approved by the Attorney General, the Deputy
Attorney General, or the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the
Criminal Division. Traditional standards of case selection are likely to be
applied in determining whether to go forward with a particular
prosecution. Thus, the Department is likely to look at the economic value
of the damage to the victim from the theft, the clarity of the proof of
criminal intent, the measures in place to protect the secrecy of the
information purloined, and the availability of civil remedies to redress the
harm short of prison, huge fines, and forfeiture.
E. The EEA Does Not Preempt Other Laws
The statute provides that it should not be construed as preempting
or displacing any other civil or criminal remedies provided by any United
States federal, state, commonwealth, possession, or territorial law for the
misappropriation of trade secrets. It also does not affect the disclosure of
information under the Freedom of Information Act."1
Thus, a corporate victim of trade secret theft may have an array of
possible avenues of retaliation available to it. Attorneys must be careful,
however, in selecting the remedies and considering a possible call to the
FBI or the Department of Justice, not to run afoul of state bar ethical rules
by improperly threatening criminal prosecution in order to gain advantage
in an ongoing civil matter. It would be better to merely alert the FBI and
let the government's investigation take its course without threatening the
other side.
17. 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a)(4), (5) (1996).
18. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1996).
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F. Protecting the Trade Secret from Disclosure in Litigation
The statute anticipates that the proof of the offense may require the
disclosure, in whole or in part, of the hitherto secret and valuable trade
secret information. Corporate counsel should seek the benefit of 18
U.S.C. § 1835 and petition the court at the outset of the matter for an
order to preserve the confidentiality of the trade secrets at issue. Should
the court not understand the sensitivity of the issue and order its disclosure,
the United States has the right to lodge an interlocutory appeal with the
Court of Appeals to forestall such missteps.
G. Enforcement Actions To Date
1. United States v. Worthington,,
Patrick Worthington, a maintenance supervisor at PPG Industries'
fiberglass research center, misappropriated diskettes, blueprints and other
types of confidential research information and offered them to the chief
executive officer of Coming Glass, which is PPG's chief competitor. The
Coming Glass CEO alerted PPG and the FBI. An undercover FBI agent
met with Worthington and his brother, Daniel, to provide them with a
$1,000 down payment for the trade secrets. Both Patrick and Daniel
Worthington were indicted under the Economic Espionage Act.10 Patrick
Worthington pled guilty and was sentenced on June 5, 1997 to fifteen
months in jail. His brother, Daniel, who was in the deal for $100, was
sentenced to five years probation, including six months of home detention.
2. United States v. Kai-Lo Hsu,,
Kai-Lo Hsu, a technical director for Taiwan's Yuen Foong Paper
Co., and Chester S. Ho, a biochemist and professor at a university in
Taiwan, were arrested as part of an FBI sting operation at the Four
Seasons Hotel in Philadelphia on June 14, 1997. An agent, posing as a
corrupt Bristol-Myers scientist and a technology information broker, met
with Mr. Kai-Lo Hsu and Mr. Ho. The objective was to steal trade secrets
relating to Bristol Myers' anti-cancer drug, Taxol. Reportedly Mr. Ho
was present at the meeting to verify the value of the Taxol technology
which was confidential while Kai-Lo Hsu and Jessica Chou agreed to pay
19. R. Mark Halligan, Reported Criminal Arrests Under the Economic Espionage Act of
1996 (visited Mar. 28, 1998) <http://www.execpc.com/-mhallign/indict.html> (citing United
States v. Worthington, Criminal No. 97-9 (W.D. Pa. 1996)).
20. 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a)(1), (3), (5) (1996).
21. Halligan, supra note 19 (citing United States v. Kai-Lo Hsu, Criminal No. 97-323
(E.D. Pa. 1997)).
[Vol. 4:373
Stuart
$400,000 for it. Ms. Chou is reportedly in Taiwan which does not have an
extradition treaty with the United States. Kai-Lo Hsu and Chester Ho have
been indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a)(4) for attempted theft of trade
secrets and 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a)(5) for conspiracy to steal trade secrets.
3. United States v. Pin Yen Yang22
Pin Yen Yang and his daughter, Hwei Chen Yang (a/k/a Sally
Yang) were arrested on September 4, 1997 at Cleveland's airport as they
were about to embark on a trip to New York. Mr. Yang, age seventy, is
the president of Four Pillars Enterprise Company, Ltd. of Taiwan. The
company manufactures and sells pressure-sensitive products in Taiwan,
Malaysia, the People's Republic of China, Singapore, and the United
States. Sally Yang is an officer of the company which has more than 900
employees and annual revenues of more than $150 million. The arrest
followed conversations by Mr. Yang and his daughter with an employee of
Avery Dennison Corporation, of Pasadena, California, which
manufacturers adhesive products such as postage stamps and mailing
labels. The Yangs wanted to obtain Avery's trade secrets from the
employee, who worked at Avery Dennison Corporation's facility in
Concord, Ohio. The Avery employee cooperated with the FBI. Federal
prosecutors estimate that the research and development costs expended to
develop the information obtained by the defendants from Avery Dennison
prior to their arrest at between $50 and $60 million. The Yangs were
charged with mail and wire fraud, conspiracy to steal trade secrets under
the Economic Espionage Act, money laundering, and receipt of stolen
goods under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1832, 1956, and 2315 (1994).
4. United States v. Steven Louis Davis
Steven Davis, a process control engineer for Wright Industries in
Nashville was assigned to be the lead process control engineer when
Gillette Company retained Wright Industries to assist in developing a new
generation of razor systems. After working on the project for a few
months, Wright Industries, at the request of Gillette, removed Davis from
the project in late September 1996. Davis thereafter sent highly
confidential engineering drawings to competitors of Gillette, including Bic
Corporation, American Safety Razor, and Warner Lambert. Davis
contacted potential purchasers by facsimile and E-mail and represented that
he had 600 megs of Gillette's product, equipment, and assembly drawings
for sale. In addition to violations of the Economic Espionage Act, 18
22. United States v. Pin Yen Yang, Criminal No. 1:97MG0109 (N.D.Ohio 1997).
23. United States v. Steven Louis Davis, (M.D. Tenn. 1997).
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U.S.C. § 1832(a)(2) and (3), Davis has been charged with wire fraud
under 18 U.S.C. § 1343.
V. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
The Economic Espionage Act of 1996 is one more step in the
relentless march of the Congress toward criminalizing behavior hitherto
considered the subject for civil litigation only. The Act provides a
powerful new tool to protect the industrial and intellectual patrimony of
corporate America. It also raises the stakes when a company fires an
employee or hires a disgruntled employee of a competitor, acquires another
company in the same or a related industry, or even when it trains its own
employees on internal trade secrets. Corporate counsel should well
develop procedures to guard against inadvertent violations.
